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Abstract
We analyse an iterated version of Nielsen and Ninomiya (N&N)’s proposed
card game experiment to search for a specific type of backward causation on
the running of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. We distinguish
“endogenous” and “exogenous” potential causes of failure of LHC and we
discover a curious “cross-talk” between their respective probabilities and oc-
currence timescales when N&N-style backward causation is in effect. Finally,
we note a kind of “statistical cosmic censorship” preventing the influence from
the future from showing up in a statistical analysis of the iterated runs.
1ids@doc.ic.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
Nielsen and Ninomiya [1] recently proposed a particle physics model with the prop-
erty that probabilities for events in the near future (say time t1) of an “initial”
state (say time t0) depend globally on the action for complete spacetime histories,
including the parts of them further in the future than t1. The usual simplification,
where we in practice consider (and sum over) only the parts of histories between
spatial hypersurfaces t0 and t1, does not apply. This gives rise to a form of backward
causation. Things like branching ratios for events here and now can depend on the
ways the various alternatives can be continued to later times. Events involving Higgs
production, such as the running of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, are
the leading candidates for such effects in their model.
In [2], Nielsen and Ninomiya (henceforth N&N) propose a card game experiment
where influence from the future upon the running of LHC could affect the odds of
drawing cards with various instructions, such as “run LHC normally” or “shut down
LHC”.
The card game version analysed by N&N in quantitative detail is a simple one-
shot affair where “shut down LHC” and “run LHC normally” are present in mixing
ratio p to 1 − p. This protocol, while providing maximal contrast between the
two branches, does require a huge level of “community self-discipline” which seems
unlikely to be achieved in practice. Upon the drawing of “shut down LHC” the
community would likely take the line that “we didn’t really mean it” and proceed
with the planned runs. That very fact – a feature of the potential time evolution
further into the future (running LHC) than a particular event (drawing a card) –
would infect the detailed structure of the influence from the future upon the present-
day enactment of the protocol.
In this paper we analyse an iterated version of the N&N protocol. The same
p : 1 − p pack as just described is used, but a new draw is performed at the start
of each agreed time period (e.g. day, week, month) and the instructions “run LHC
normally” or “shut down LHC” refer just to that time period. Thus at no stage is
the overwhelming demand being made that LHC be permanently closed. Further,
the pattern of runs and idle periods thrown up by enacting the iterated protocol is
a “deliverable” in its own right, no less than the LHC run data, and available for
statistical scrutiny by interested parties.
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2 The relevant aspects of the N&N model
In [1], N&N discuss the possible impact on the usual classical or quantum action rules
– respectively, find a history with extremal action, or sum over the exponentiated
actions of all histories – of allowing an imaginary part in the Lagrangian specifying
a history’s action. They give reasons for the Higgs field to be the place one could
expect an imaginary part to show up.
The mathematical effects of allowing an imaginary part in the Lagrangian are
subtle and far-reaching, and according to [1] may even extend as far as determining
(with probability very close to 1) a particular solution to the equations of motion,
rather than just a recipe for computing some features of a solution from other fea-
tures. Stepping back from these lofty longer-term goals, though, N&N in [2] special-
ize the discussion to a simplified case of their full model, where roughly identifiable
“classical” trajectories (i.e. with probabilities rather than amplitudes attached) have
been located as solutions, and the influence of the imaginary part of the Lagrangian
is a simple multiplicative one, as follows.
Consider two solutions (“classical” histories) which, in the absence of an imagi-
nary part in the Lagrangian, would have been assigned equal probabilities. Suppose
that on one history a machine such as LHC is built and produces Higgs particles,
while on the other history no such machine is built. Then, in the presence of the
imaginary part of the Lagrangian, the relative probabilities of the two solutions are
modified by an exponential in the number of Higgses:
P (sol.with machine)
P (sol.without machine)
= C♯Higgses (1)
(Of course Higgs particles can be produced without deliberate intent, for example
in the hot big bang. In [1], N&N give reasons for believing that at least in the
classical approximation under consideration, the early universe may be taken as fixed
across the branches, and it is legitimate to focus on the differences in contemporary
Higgs production between one branch and another. We will accept their argument
for the purposes of this paper.)
Although it is not stated explicitly in [2], we take it that the formula (1) extends
in the obvious way to solutions with unequal probabilities. That is, using “uninflu-
enced” and “influenced” to refer to probabilities in the absence and in the presence
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respectively of a Lagrangian imaginary term, we have:
Pinfluenced(sol.with machine)
Pinfluenced(sol.without machine)
=
Puninfluenced(sol.with machine)
Puninfluenced(sol.without machine)
C♯Higgses (2)
In (1) or (2) above, if C < 1 Higgs production is suppressed in processes generally,
while if C > 1 it is enhanced. N&N consider the latter case effectively ruled out by
the lack of apparent conspiracies of coincidence all around us producing more than
their normal fair share of Higgs particles. Thus they (and we) focus on the case
C < 1.
Normalization
A collection of mutually exclusive and exhaustive classical histories should be as-
signed probabilities which sum to 1. In standard prescriptions for assigning proba-
bilities to classical histories, such as multiplying out the branching factors for each
path on a tree of alternatives, this happens automatically provided simple local con-
straints are obeyed (e.g. that the branching factors sum to 1 at each node, in the
tree of alternatives case). No final global normalization is required.
The simplified N&N model with its multiplicative influence (1) or (2) unfortu-
nately does not assign an individually computed probability to each history. Only
ratios of probabilities are prescribed. To achieve these ratios one first computes the
uninfluenced probabilities by the usual formal or informal classical reasoning (e.g.
by consideration of things like mixing ratios in a pack of cards, estimates of human
propensity for various courses of behaviour, and so forth); and then one multiplies
each history’s probability by the appropriate influence factor (C♯Higgses, or a general-
ization thereof). These influenced but unnormalized probabilities stand in the right
ratios to one another, but they do not in general sum to 1. They must therefore be
(globally) normalized by dividing through by their sum.
This final global normalization is perhaps the least satisfying aspect of the simpli-
fied approximate N&N model. However, it presents no technical difficulties, other
than the potential complexity of computing the sum. We would be interested to
know if a (presumably fully quantum) version of their model can be found which is
free from the need for such normalization.
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3 The iterated card game: definition
We described our iterated version of the N&N card game briefly in our introductory
remarks. Here we specify it precisely, define useful notation referring to it, and
clarify and motivate our assumptions (which sometimes differ from N&N’s) about
the various defined terms.
At the start of each time period, the intention of the human agents enacting the
protocol is to draw a card from a pack, and follow the instruction printed on it, which
will be either “don’t run LHC this period” or “run LHC normally this period”, with
mixing ratio p : 1 − p. We assume “community self-discipline”, i.e. the instruction
drawn is followed. (Recall that the likely lack of such self-discipline in the one-shot
version was our motive for moving to an iterated version of the game.)
Neither the LHC as a piece of hardware, nor the society surrounding it, offers
a perfect guarantee that an intended run will actually happen. In [2], N&N use
the blanket term “accident” for the thwarting of the successful running of LHC for
whatever reason. The most straightforward case would be failure of the hardware,
but they also give “war between the member states of CERN” as an example of the
diversity of possible causes.
The potential causes of failure of LHC can broadly be divided into what might be
called “endogenous” and “exogenous” kinds. An “endogenous” failure is associated
with the act of trying a run, and basically refers to failure of the hardware. For
simplicity we take such a failure to be severe enough to ruin LHC permanently,
although one could envisage a yet finer split into categories of damage whose repair
takes various lengths of time, and so forth.
An “exogenous” failure is associated with the surrounding society, and is in-
dependent of whether or not a run would be tried this time period. Indeed, it is
simplest to take exogenous failure as manifesting at the very beginning of a period
– i.e. the agents do not even draw a card. Analogously to our simplifying assump-
tion about endogenous failure above, we assume an exogenous failure brings the
whole protocol to an end. War between the member states of CERN would be the
paradigm example.
N&N use the term “accident”, assumed to have probability a, to cover all failures
of LHC, but for the iterated version we will distinguish the endogenous and exoge-
nous failures, referring to them as “accident” (to the hardware) and “breakdown”
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(of the whole protocol) respectively, with respective probabilities (per opportunity)
a and b. (These terms are chosen for their mnemonic alphabetical adjacency and are
not intended to be perfectly descriptive of the vast class of conceiveable endogenous
and exogenous failures.)
Event structure in one time period
If the iterated game is still in progress as we enter a new time period (i.e. if no
“accident” or “breakdown” has occurred earlier), exactly one of the four available
events A, B, R, R¯ will occur in this period. These stand for “accident”, “break-
down”, “run of LHC”, and “no run of LHC” respectively. The tree of alternatives
is as follows. Note that their listed probabilities are, for now, the straightforward
“uninfluenced” ones got by the usual sort of probabilistic reasoning.
• First, the surrounding society impinges on the protocol. With probability b
the protocol is exogenously brought to an end here (“breakdown”).
Symbol B; (uninfluenced) probability pB ≡ b.
• With probability 1 − b the protocol continues and a card is drawn from the
pack. The card has instruction “don’t run LHC this period” with probability
p, in which case no run is attempted. The protocol continues to the next time
period.
Symbol R¯; (uninfluenced) probability pR¯ ≡ (1− b)p.
• Alternatively, with probability 1 − p, the card drawn has instruction “run
LHC normally this period”, in which case a run is attempted. At this point
we have the opportunity for an “accident” (endogenous failure) to occur, with
probability a. Like “breakdown” this halts the protocol.
Symbol A; (uninfluenced) probability pA ≡ (1− b)(1− p)a.
• If no accident occurs the run proceeds successfully. (This is the event that will
attract a multiplicative influence due to the production of Higgs particles.)
The protocol continues to the next time period.
Symbol R; (uninfluenced) probability pR ≡ (1− b)(1− p)(1− a).
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Classical histories of the iterated game
The iterated card game with the above event structure and stopping rules has clas-
sical histories of the form RR¯R¯RR¯A or R¯RR¯R¯RRR¯RB. The pattern of R and R¯
in these examples is arbitrary; a history can be any sequence of zero or more of R
or R¯, in any order and admixture, followed by either A or B as terminating event.
It is not to be regarded as tragic that all histories end in accident or breakdown
– the protocol is an expression of the sentiment “if we can still run LHC, do keep
running it” (modulo the result of the card draw in each period of course). We are
interested in questions such as: What happens before the iterated game inevitably
ends? How long does the game typically last, what is the pattern of events, and
which way does it end – A or B?
A history with nR Rs, nR¯ R¯s, nA As, and nB Bs (these last two being either 1
and 0, or 0 and 1 of course) has (uninfluenced) probability
Puninfl.(history) = pR
nRpR¯
n
R¯pA
nApB
nB (3)
It is automatic, and an easy exercise in algebra to verify, that the sum of the value
of this expression over all the available histories is 1.
Multiplicative influence on a classical history
Let us assume that a run of LHC which lasts one time period produces some standard
typical number of Higgs particles, ♯Higgses in one run, and let us write σ for the
expression C♯Higgses in one run. (Note that we have σ < 1 since C < 1.) Then a history
with nR Rs will be subject to a multiplicative influence of σ
nR.
For conceptual clarity we may as well “distribute” this influence down to the
probabilities of the events which contribute to it. If for each event type E ∈
{A,B,R, R¯} we write φE for the influenced (but still unnormalized) probability
of that event type (pE being its uninfluenced probability, as listed earlier), then we
have φA = pA, φB = pB, φR¯ = pR¯, but φR = σpR = (1− b)(1− p)(1− a)σ.
A history with nR Rs, nR¯ R¯s, nA As, and nB Bs can thus have its influenced
but unnormalized probability written as
Pinfl.,unnorm.(history) = φR
nRφR¯
n
R¯φA
nAφB
nB (4)
Of course the sum-over-histories of this expression will be less than 1.
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Some brief notes on where our assumptions differ from N&N’s
We already noted above our splitting of N&N’s single failure category into separate
categories of endogenous “accident” and exogenous “breakdown”. For the benefit of
readers steeped in N&N’s notation and assumptions, we briefly note other differences
between our setup and theirs.
• In their quantitative analysis N&N assume for simplicity that any branch
of their tree of alternatives with Higgs particle production can be dropped
altogether in their model (i.e. can be taken as having influenced probability
zero, or negligible). In our notation this is like taking σ << 1. This would not
be appropriate for the iterated protocol, since after all the time periods could
be very short (minutes, seconds...)2 and not much multiplicative influence
will creep into any one period. Histories with copious Higgs production are of
course still strongly suppressed, but the mathematical expression of this fact
becomes, not that σ be small, but that it be raised to a high power (nR).
• N&N take the pack mixing ratio p, and their accident probability a (which we
disaggregate into a and b), to be small (<< 1). Their motive for choosing p
small is the unacceptability of the card game to the community if p is large and
the associated instruction is “shut down LHC forever”. The iterated protocol
does not have this problem (at least not to that stark extent!) and we can
choose pmore freely. As for a and b (or for N&N just a), they assume smallness
to keep rough comparability with p (or just to simplify the mathematics). We
prefer to drop that assumption too, since after all complex machinery does
have a non-negligible accident rate, and societies do often undergo convulsions
leading to the interruption of big projects (war being only one of many possible
scenarios here). Thus in our analysis we do not assume p, a or b small. We
are of course free to plug in small values to any expressions derived, but we
derive the expressions without approximation.
• N&N perform a kind of “meta-analysis” by introducing a parameter r to rep-
resent an externally agreed probability (like a Bayesian prior) for their model
2 At least for conceivable accelerator hardware. We leave aside whether ramping up and down
the actual hardware of LHC on short timescales would be at all feasible!
8
being correct at all. (They also very modestly set r << 1, in effect taking the
meta-analyst to be a natural skeptic of new theories.)
In this paper we are always asking: what would the world be like if the N&N
model were true? Thus in effect we are always setting r = 1, at least for the
purposes of answering that overarching question. Note, though, that with our
notation one can “switch off” the model by setting σ = 1. Therefore, one
could perform a meta-analysis by giving a prior distribution for σ (i.e. 1 − r
for σ = 1, and r shared out among values of σ < 1). But this is not something
that we do in this paper.
• Finally, N&N perform a cost-benefit analysis by assigning equivalent money or
utility values to the outcomes of various scenarios. (Indeed, this is their main
motive for having a meta-analysis variable r.) We will not do this explicitly,
although from time to time we will refer to the general intuitive “goodness”
or “badness” of various histories, from the viewpoint both of the scientific
community (awaiting run data from LHC) and of the broader society (pre-
sumably hoping to avoid at least the more convulsive forms of the category
“breakdown”).
4 The iterated card game: analysis
To analyse the iterated card game we must compute the normalized influenced prob-
abilities of the available histories. We first compute the normalization factor N.F.
by summing the influenced but unnormalized probabilities of all histories:
N.F. ≡
∑
histories
Pinfl.,unnorm.(history) =
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
φR|R¯
nR|R¯φA|B
=
φA|B
1− φR|R¯
(5)
(In (5) and elsewhere we abbreviate sums of probabilities or occurrence counts over
alternatives by listing the alternatives in bar-separated fashion – that is, nR|R¯ means
nR + nR¯, and so forth.)
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We can then divide the earlier expression (4) by N.F. to obtain the normalized
influenced probability for a history with nR Rs, nR¯ R¯s, nA As, and nB Bs:
Pinfl.,norm.(history) ≡
Pinfl.,unnorm.(history)
N.F.
=
φR
nRφR¯
n
R¯φA
nAφB
nB
φA|B
1−φR|R¯
(6)
Let us specialize this rather forbidding expression to a history ending in A or B
respectively – i.e. with nA = 1, nB = 0 or nA = 0, nB = 1 respectively.
Pinfl.,norm.(history ending in A) = φR
nRφR¯
n
R¯(
φA
φA|B
[1− φR|R¯]) (7)
Pinfl.,norm.(history ending in B) = φR
nRφR¯
n
R¯(
φB
φA|B
[1− φR|R¯]) (8)
This is the same probability distribution (assignment of probabilities to histories)
as the uninfluenced distribution we would have obtained if, instead of pR, pR¯, pA,
pB in (3) above, we had used ρR, ρR¯, ρA, ρB, defined as follows:
ρR ≡ φR = σpR = (1− b)(1− p)(1− a)σ (9)
ρR¯ ≡ φR¯ = pR¯ = (1− b)p (10)
ρA ≡
φA
φA|B
[1− ρR|R¯] =
φA
φA|B
[1− φR|R¯] =
pA
pA|B
[1 − σpR − pR¯]
=
(1− b)(1 − p)a
(1− b)(1− p)a+ b
[1− (1− b)(1 − p)(1− a)σ − (1− b)p] (11)
ρB ≡
φB
φA|B
[1− ρR|R¯] =
φB
φA|B
[1− φR|R¯] =
pB
pA|B
[1− σpR − pR¯]
=
b
(1− b)(1− p)a + b
[1− (1− b)(1− p)(1− a)σ − (1− b)p] (12)
That is, with {ρE} (E ∈ {A,B,R, R¯}) defined as above, the normalized influenced
probability of every history is given by
Pinfl.,norm.(history) = ρR
nRρR¯
n
R¯ρA
nAρB
nB (13)
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Thus the {ρE} can be thought of as de facto normalized influenced probabilities
for the event types E. Note, however, that for more complicated protocols – for
example involving agents with memory, who do things like adjust the mixing ratio p
depending on the outcomes of previous draws – the normalized influenced probability
distribution is unlikely to be a mere “re-parametrization” of the uninfluenced one.
That is, there will not, in general, exist a choice of {ρE} or analogues thereof such
that substituting them for the original {pE} or analogues thereof mimics the effects
of N&N-style backward causation. We just got lucky with the simple memoryless
protocol explored here!
A helpful intuitive story for obtaining ρR, ρR¯, ρA, ρB from pR, pR¯, pA, pB goes
like this: First, the probabilities for the non-terminating events (R, R¯) shrink under
whatever multiplicative influence (if any) they are individually subject to, which
happens to be an unbalanced (non-ratio-preserving) shrinkage, since ρR < pR but
ρR¯ = pR¯. Then, the probabilities for the terminating events (A, B) grow in balanced
(ratio-preserving) style – i.e. the ratio ρA : ρB is the same as pA : pB – to the extent
necessary to “fill the gap” and ensure the four event probabilities sum to 1.
With the normalized influenced probability distribution established, we can pro-
ceed to study the effects of N&N-style backward causation on the statistics of the
iterated card game.
The physics community perspective: how much run data can
we squeeze out of LHC?
Let us first look at things from the perspective of a caricatured LHC physics com-
munity, which we define as not caring about goings-on in the broader society, but
instead concerning itself only with how much run data can be squeezed out of LHC
before the game ends (in “accident” or “breakdown”).
The goal from this perspective is to maximize n̂R, the expectation value of the
number of periods a successful run of LHC takes place. We have a, b, σ fixed by the
properties of the LHC hardware, the surrounding society, and the N&N Lagrangian
respectively, but p choosable. We compute n̂R:
n̂R ≡
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)nR(history)
11
=
ρR
ρR|R¯
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)nR|R¯(history)
=
ρR
ρR|R¯
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρA|B][nR|R¯]
=
ρR
ρA|B
=
(1− b)(1− p)(1− a)σ
1− (1− b)(1− p)(1− a)σ − (1− b)p
(14)
By differentiating w.r.t. p we find that this expression is monotonically decreasing
in p in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Thus the physics community would want to set p = 0,
that is to say, not play the card game at all but just run LHC in every period. With
this choice the expression for n̂R becomes:
n̂R(p = 0) =
(1− b)(1− a)σ
1− (1− b)(1 − a)σ
(15)
As expected this goes to zero as σ → 0. However, it goes to zero more slowly
than would any n̂R(p > 0).
The broader society perspective: how long till breakdown?
We now turn to the perspective of the “broader society”. Our caricature here is
the opposite of that for the physics community. The broader society is defined as
having no interest in the quantity of run data from LHC, nor in whether it suffers
hardware failure (our category “accident”). Rather, its concern is with our category
“breakdown” – this can be presumed, at least in its more convulsive forms, to be an
unpleasant experience to live through.
Recall that B has an exogenously given risk rate b in our simple setup. That
is, even in the absence of LHC, or more pertinently, even after an accident (A)
has halted the card game, B events continue to occur with probability b per time
period. (Of course, by “B” in such non-game or post-game circumstances we mean
whatever sort of event in society would halt LHC runs had there been any. The
broader society dislikes such events not for their actual or counterfactual halting
of LHC, but for their potentially convulsive nature generally.) Thus we should not
ask: Can we avoid B altogether? but rather: What is the expected time to the
next occurrence of B? In the absence of influence from the future this is 1/b, by
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elementary properties of the exponential distribution. We now compute it for the
influenced probability distribution given by the {ρE}.
For a history ending in B, the expected time of occurrence of B (numbering the
periods 1, 2, 3...) is simply the actual time B occurs, i.e. the length of that history:
t̂B(history ending in B) = tB(history) = length(history) (16)
For a history ending in A, we have no B within the history, but as discussed above
we expect a post-game B to occur eventually. Once the accident has occurred there
is no influence from the future to contend with, i.e. the straightforward uninfluenced
risk rate b applies. Thus an occurrence of A at time tA can be taken to herald an
occurrence of B at (expected) later time tA + 1/b:
t̂B(history ending in A) = tA(history) + 1/b
= length(history) + 1/b (17)
We can now compute t̂B:
t̂B ≡
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)t̂B(history)
=
∑
histories ending in B
[Pinfl.,norm.(history)][length(history)]
+
∑
histories ending in A
[Pinfl.,norm.(history)][length(history) + 1/b]
=
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρB][nR|R¯ + 1] +
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρA][nR|R¯ + 1 + 1/b]
=
1
pB
−
1
pA|B
+
1
ρA|B
=
1
b
−
1
(1− b)(1− p)a+ b
+
1
1− (1− b)(1 − p)(1− a)σ − (1− b)p
(18)
(We omit the tedious algebra leading to the final “sum or difference of reciprocals”
form, which seems to be the simplest possible.)
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One can get an intuitive grip on (18) by setting q ≡ 1−p and defining “influence
constants” i1, i2 as follows:
i1 ≡ (1− b)a
i2 ≡ (1− b)(1− a)(1− σ) (19)
Then (18) becomes:
t̂B =
1
b
−
1
b+ i1q
+
1
b+ (i1 + i2)q
(20)
The variation of t̂B with q now becomes clear: the three reciprocals are equal
when q = 0, but as we increase q they separate – the first staying fixed, the second
and third falling, with the third (being added) always smaller than the second (being
subtracted). An immediate consequence is that t̂B is at its maximum when q = 0
(i.e. when p = 1). However it is not in general monotonically decreasing in q in
the range 0 ≤ q ≤ 1: differentiating w.r.t. q shows it to reach a minimum at
q = b/
√
i1(i1 + i2) (if that value is in the range 0..1) and start increasing again,
though it never again attains its q = 0 value.
We see then that the broader society would prefer to set q = 0 (p = 1), that is
to say, not run LHC at all. Of course t̂B is then just 1/b. The nonmonotonicity of
t̂B with q deserves further comment, however. It is best thought of as arising from
a kind of “cross-talk” between, on the one hand, the effect of the influence from the
future on the timescale for halting the protocol by either terminating event (A or
B), and on the other, the impact of q on which terminating event it shall be. The
expected time for LHC to be halted for whatever reason is
t̂A|B =
∑
histories
[Pinfl.,norm.(history)][length(history)]
=
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρA|B][nR|R¯ + 1]
=
1
ρA|B
=
1
b+ (i1 + i2)q
(21)
– and this is clearly monotonically decreasing in q. On the other hand, the odds
ratio “ending in A” : “ending in B” is just ρA : ρB, which we earlier observed is the
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same as pA : pB, namely (1 − b)qa : b, which becomes more favourable to A at the
expense of B as q increases. This provides a “safety valve” effect: at high enough q
the protocol is indeed brought to a halt very quickly, but with odds shifted in the
direction of A, which (after it happens) relaxes the risk of B to its uninfluenced level
(timescale 1/b).
A numerical example
Let us put some numerical flesh on these algebraic bones. Take the time period
to be a week, and set a = b = 0.0002 (once-per-century uninfluenced accident or
breakdown timescale), σ = 0.9. If we choose q = 0 we have t̂B = t̂A|B = 1/b = 5000,
the uninfluenced timescale of a century or so.
If we increase q to 0.04 (near the minimum-t̂B value, which in this example is
q ≈ 0.0447), we obtain t̂A|B ≈ 238. Thus already the likely timescale for something
to halt the protocol has shrunk from a century to a few years. Furthermore, the
odds ρA : ρB are about 1 : 25, i.e. the reason will almost certainly turn out to be
“breakdown”. These effects combine to yield t̂B ≈ 430.
If we make the choice q = 1, we get t̂A|B ≈ 10: something will halt the protocol in
a matter of weeks. However, the odds ρA : ρB are now ≈ 1 : 1, so we have the “safety
valve” of a 0.5 probability that the reason will turn out to be not “breakdown” but
“accident”. This is reflected in the value t̂B ≈ 2510. In effect we are tossing a fair
coin and gambling on breakdown in weeks versus a century.
5 Statistical cosmic censorship
The above analysis and numerical example shows that N&N-style backward causa-
tion can be pretty powerful stuff. It can greatly enhance the likelihood of a quick
occurrence of what we would normally regard as remote contingencies. It is natural
to ask: what are the prospects for empirical study of the influence from the future?
Would we know it when we see it?
If we enact the iterated card game protocol and quickly experience an event of the
sort we have called “accident” or “breakdown”, we are left in the awkward situation
of not really knowing (as opposed to estimating) the uninfluenced probabilities of
these contingencies, which depend on the nature of complex hardware and a complex
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society. People of goodwill will disagree in their estimates. Those whose estimates
are on the high side will simply give a resigned shrug. “That’s life”, they will say.
There is, however, one feature of the protocol which has a clear-cut uninfluenced
probabilistic structure: the drawing of a card in each time period. Everyone can
agree that the uninfluenced probability of drawing the instruction “don’t run LHC
this period” is p. And as we mentioned in our introductory remarks, the pattern of
runs and idle periods is the protocol’s “deliverable”, available for statistical scrutiny
by interested parties. What can they conclude if they perform a statistical analysis?
Can they detect the hand of N&N-style backward causation?
A card draw occurs part-way through its time period and there is not a one-
one mapping between results of draws and event labels. A drawing of “run LHC
normally this period” (which we will abbreviate “yes”, Y ) happens in events A and
R. A drawing of “don’t run LHC this period” (which we will abbreviate “no”, N)
happens only in event R¯. No draw at all occurs in event B since exogenous halting
is assumed to occur at the beginning of a time period. Hence a draw pattern (of Y
and N) is got from a regular event history by dropping B, changing A and R into
Y , and changing R¯ into N .
We can conveniently quantify the strength of the influence from the future on
the pattern of card draws by defining the discrepancy D between the actual number
of drawings of “no” and the number expected purely on the basis of multiplying the
total number of draws by the “no” mixing ratio p. That is:
D ≡ nN − (nY |N)p (22)
Those using uninfluenced probabilistic reasoning will assign this an expectation
value D̂ = 0 – although of course they anticipate that the actual (outcome) dis-
crepancy will suffer binomial-style fluctuation of order
√
(nY |N)pq about its zero
expected value.
We compute the expected discrepancy under the influenced probability distribu-
tion given by the {ρE}:
D̂ ≡
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)D(history)
=
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)[nN − (nY |N)p](history)
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=
∑
histories
Pinfl.,norm.(history)[nR¯ − (nA|R|R¯)p](history)
=
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρA][
ρR¯
ρR|R¯
nR|R¯ − (nR|R¯ + 1)p]
+
∑
0≤nR|R¯<∞
[ρR|R¯
n
R|R¯ρB][
ρR¯
ρR|R¯
nR|R¯ − (nR|R¯)p]
= [ p ] [
pB
pA|B
] [ 1−
pA|B
ρA|B
] (23)
(We again omit the tedious algebra leading to the final form.) D̂ is thus the product
of three factors each manifestly in the range 0..1, and is therefore in the range 0..1
also.3 In other words, the influence from the future shifts D̂ by less than a single
card from its uninfluenced value – a shift lost in the order-
√
(nY |N)pq fluctuation
in the actual (outcome) discrepancy. Statistical analysis of the card draws will not
reveal the hand of N&N-style backward causation.
Hence we find ourselves in a startling epistemic situation if we try to do statisti-
cal analysis in an N&N world. The “epistemically opaque” aspects of the enactment
of the protocol, such as the timescale for the one-off event of being forcibly halted,
are potentially greatly influenced by N&N-style backward causation; while the one
clearly epistemically accessible aspect – the drawing of a card, which has a straight-
forward probability structure controlled by the mix of cards in the pack, and which is
a repeated rather than one-off event, allowing the accumulation of statistics – is not
detectably influenced at all! It is thus peculiarly difficult (at least with this protocol)
for the inhabitants of a world subject to N&N-style backward causation to gather
evidence revealing their predicament. This situation might be called “statistical
cosmic censorship”.
We close by conjecturing that statistical cosmic censorship may be a generic,
or at least common, feature of models with N&N-style backward causation – and,
3 It may be helpful to make judicious use of q ≡ 1−p and the “influence constants” i1, i2 defined
earlier:
D̂ = [ p ] [
b
b+ i1q
] [
i2q
b+ (i1 + i2)q
] (24)
It is then immediate that each factor is in the range 0..1.
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perhaps, of theories with other types of non-standard casual structure too. We would
welcome efforts to define the syndrome more precisely, and to explore what reliable
knowledge can and cannot be acquired by agents enacting experimental protocols of
their choice in a world where the future, as well as the past, informs their actions.
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